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Introduction: great disruptions: the 
new normal?
Recent history has not been kind to Fukuyama’s 
‘end of history’ thesis, expounded thirty years 
ago (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). Writing back then, 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the break-up 
of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama’s conten-
tion concerned what he saw as the triumph of 
Western-style liberal-democratic free-market 
capitalism. Subsequent events have thrown 
such celebratory claims of the success of global 
political and economic liberalism into ques-
tion. The resurgence of Russia, the ascendancy 
of China’s state authoritarianism, and the rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism are all proof that 
major ideological contests have far from disap-
peared. Yet further, over the past two decades 
or so, disruptions and upheavals within and 
among the capitalist West itself have revealed 
the fragility of market-based democracies.
The verities of the post-war social demo-
cratic model that underpinned Western capit-
alism—albeit to varying degrees and in various 
guises across countries—namely a commitment 
to full employment, rising real incomes, social 
inclusion and equal access to public services, 
including health care, have increasingly un-
ravelled. The Western social order no longer 
fulfils its promise of an economy that offers 
a good place for everyone. As Sandbu (2020) 
puts it: ‘just as an economy used to sustain a 
psychological, sociological, and political to-
getherness, so the end of economic belonging 
has undermined these types of cohesion’ (9). 
Large numbers of people in the West who could 
previously expect decent earnings insecure jobs 
are instead now confronted with precarious 
employment that often pays too little to main-
tain a reasonable standard of living. It has also 
become clear that this predicament particularly 
affects not only certain social groups but also 
certain places and regions, with detrimental 
impacts on the communities involved. At the 
same time, other groups and places have en-
joyed rising prosperity and richer opportunities 
than ever before.
It is not surprising that those groups and 
places excluded from these gains, benefits 
and advantages feel aggrieved. They see the 
economy and the rules that govern it as having 
been rigged for the benefit of others, especially 
the political, corporate and financial elites that 
set the rules and who are based in the most 
prosperous places. Again, to quote Sandbu, ‘an 
economy—and politics—that benefits some 
people and places while locking others out of 
prosperity is what the end of belonging means’ 
(10). Even Fukuyama now recognises this 
problem. Writing in 2014, on the 25th anniver-
sary of his original essay on the end of history, 
he acknowledged that the biggest problem 
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in some countries was not ideological but 
‘their failure to provide the substance of what 
people want from government: personal se-
curity, shared economic growth and the basic 
public services...that are needed to achieve in-
dividual opportunity’. (https://www.wsj.com/
articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-
democracy-1402080661). Across many Western 
countries, the failure of the post-war liberal 
democratic political-economic model to pro-
vide those expected outcomes for many groups 
and places has resulted in disillusionment and 
disaffection—in ‘geographies of discontent’.
As such, we would argue that the current 
period offers a particularly critical juncture in 
this regard, whereby the disruptions brought 
about by increasing automation, inequality 
and uneven development, climate change and 
most recently the Covid-19 pandemic, and their 
manifestly unequal spatial impacts, point to a 
series of possible and uncertain futures. In the 
material that follows, we offer an overview 
of the ‘geographies of discontent’ and highlight 
the possible role of the State, before introducing 
the contributors to this issue of the Cambridge 
Journal of Regions, Economy and Society.
Sources of discontent
In seeking to assess the sources of discon-
tent, a wide range of socio-economic and en-
vironmental factors come into play. Indeed, 
throughout history, the impact of the disease 
has often been pivotal in driving disruptions 
that can up-end entire civilisations, as the spread 
of smallpox during the European conquest 
of the Americas demonstrated; which devas-
tated Native American populations (Diamond, 
2013),1 or the impact of the ‘Black Death’ in the 
14th century in shifting the balance of power in 
feudal societies (as the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt 
in England would attest). Major economic dis-
locations and disruptions have likewise driven 
social discontent, such as the Luddite textile 
workers’ protest at technological change in 
the early 19th century. That these sources of 
discontent have always had marked spatial 
aspects is also evident (AIRoy, 1970). The dis-
cussions on 19th-century populism in the USA 
(Taggart, 1948) and the then Russian Empire 
(Fedotov, 1942), for example, were framed in 
terms of agricultural communities.
As such, geography (and therefore territory) 
has been significant simply by dint of the fact 
that areas, or regions, that are marginal in phys-
ical, economic or political terms (or a combin-
ation thereof) are more prone to discontent, 
as the current literature on ‘left behind places’ 
(for example, Rodriguez-Pose, 2018) would at-
test. That is, what is integral here is the sense (in 
economic or political terms) of the level of con-
nection to the spatial concentration of know-
ledge and power in societies (Gregory, 2015). 
Echoing contemporary developments, rural 
areas were more resistant to the spread of new 
ideas emanating from urban centres. For ex-
ample, the spread of Protestantism in Northern 
Europe was often accompanied by rebellion 
and violent insurrection in more remote, con-
servative areas far from the seats of power—for 
example, the ‘Pilgrimage of Grace’ in Yorkshire 
in 1536, where a combination of economic, pol-
itical and ecclesiastical factors underpinned the 
revolt against Henry VIII (Davies, 1968).
However, the link between discontent and 
economic hardship is complex. It is certainly 
true that the inter-war years of the 20th cen-
tury saw both economic misery—whether from 
hyperinflation or depression—and the emer-
gence of a wide variety of political parties which 
departed from conventional orthodoxy. While 
attention is naturally drawn to the NSDAP 
and the rise of Hitler, and the war and geno-
cide they eventually prosecuted, the 1930s saw 
a wholesale move away from the laissez-faire 
economics that had previously been politically 
mainstream—whether towards the New Deal 
economic policies of Franklin D Roosevelt or 
Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. It 
is notable that many of the areas that have in 
present times redrawn the political map exhib-
ited considerable discontent during this period 
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as well. Jarrow in North-East England is a typ-
ical example: famous for the Jarrow March of 
1936, it also probably voted overwhelmingly 
to leave the EU in 2016 (Hanretty, 2016). The 
salience of the link between two such pivotal 
events 80 years apart has been noted elsewhere 
(Allen, 2021).
Yet economic hardship alone can hardly be 
seen as the only driving force behind the dis-
content of the 1920s and 1930s and the dramatic 
events this engendered. After all, by the stand-
ards of most of human history and most of the 
world at the time, Europeans (and even more so 
a majority of Americans) of the 1930s enjoyed 
enviable living standards, especially when com-
pared to the subjugated colonial populations 
across Africa and Asia, for whom discontent 
against European rule would erupt in the inde-
pendence movements of the 1940s and 1950s. 
One could make the point that these peoples 
were the ultimate example of communities far 
removed from the social-spatial concentrations 
of power: populism has hardly been limited to 
wealthy nations. In the post-war period, Egypt’s 
Nasser could very reasonably be labelled a 
populist leader.2 Similarly, Narendra Modi is 
not the first Indian leader to be associated with 
the label (Subramanian, 2007).
Yet for all that, recent events have led to a 
flurry of scholarly activity and new research 
in the field. However, populism and discon-
tent both have a long history of academic 
study. Indeed, much was already apparent 
from Ionescu and Gellner’s pioneering study 
of the subject in the late-1960s. Even at that 
time, the particular spatial manifestations 
of populist movements were noted, being in 
areas or countries ‘peripheral to economic 
power’ (AlRoy, 1970, 969), alongside the 
‘tensions’ associated with spatial disparities 
in economic development (and particularly 
within-country disparities). Populism as 
both a discursive concept and as an ideology, 
though, has shifted through the years—
proving remarkably difficult to pin down 
(Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013).
There are, of course, myriad contemporary 
disruptions that act as sources of discontent, 
many of which have been operative for some 
time: globalisation, inequality, and techno-
logical and environmental change. Some of the 
literature of the late 20th century—well before 
the events of the ‘Great Recession’—appears 
remarkably prescient, foreshadowing recent 
events (Taggart, 1995, 1997). The risks of ma-
joritarian tyranny, which is arguably inherent 
to populism, were clearly identified in the 
American populist tradition (Kazin, 1998). Of 
course, the period since the 1990s has seen the 
rapid (re)emergence of China as a pre-eminent 
economy and the expansion and closer integra-
tion of the EU, which sit alongside the USA as 
members of the ‘Global Triad’ (Dicken, 2014) 
within which world economic activity is con-
centrated. Yet development within these world 
regions has been increasingly uneven, both spa-
tially and in terms of inter-personal inequality 
(Dicken, 2014).
Thus in seeking to understand the driving 
economic factors of contemporary discontent, it 
is imperative to understand how uneven devel-
opment and dissociation from the spatial con-
centrations of knowledge and power has fuelled 
populist sentiments in particular regions. In this 
context, the erosion of relative economic priv-
ilege has been one of several key factors driving 
the growth and resurgence of identity politics in 
recent years. Donald Trump’s promise in 2016 
to bring back manufacturing jobs had reson-
ance precisely for those groups that have seen 
the most rapid erosion of their perceived priv-
ilege: structural economic change and changes 
in migration patterns are highly salient factors 
fuelling discontent.
The problems provoked by the pressure 
of relatively rapid population change over a 
short period of time on public service pro-
vision can be illustrated by the example of 
Boston in Lincolnshire (UK) whose popula-
tion expanded more between 2003 and 2007 
than it did between 1981 and 2003.3 This was 
in large part due to the accession of new EU 
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member states in 2004, from which large 
numbers of individuals were drawn to work 
in the horticultural sector in and around the 
Boston region. Official statistics suggest that 
the ‘white, non-UK national’ population ex-
panded from 2500 (4.3% of the population) 
in 2004 to 19,900 (29.4% of the population) 
in 2017, before shrinking to 14,200 (20.9% 
of the population) in 2019.4 That growth, in 
turn, put pressure on public service delivery 
in the region, with Lincolnshire East Clinical 
Commissioning Group (CCG) (which con-
tains Boston, Skegness and East Lindsay) 
having 2026 patients per full-time GP in 2019, 
compared to the England average of 1721 pa-
tients per full-time GP. The skew is even more 
extreme when the age of the population is 
taken into consideration.5 It is perhaps not 
surprising then that such disparities in ser-
vice provision under the impact of austerity 
have been argued by some to be key factors in 
the Brexit vote (Fetzer, 2019; Gietel-Basten, 
2016). The Boston parliamentary constituency 
had the highest ‘Leave’ share of the vote in the 
UK (some 75%; see also Hanratty, 2016).
The growing political divergence between 
many urban areas and their peri-urban hin-
terlands and the consequent ‘revolt of the 
regions’ (MacLeod and Jones, 2018)  or 
‘revenge of the places that don’t matter’ 
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2018) is by no means con-
fined to the UK. Not dissimilar spatial dif-
ferences in economic, cultural and political 
conditions can be observed between the 
Ile-de-France and the rest of metropolitan 
France, between northern and southern Italy, 
between Istanbul and much of Anatolia. The 
erosion of ‘good work’ during the neoliberal 
post-1980 period (De Ruyter and Burgess, 
2003) and more recent growth of the ‘Gig 
Economy’ (De Ruyter and Brown, 2019) is 
likewise a part of this economic polarisa-
tion, although the relationship between this 
and political outcomes, like the interaction 
between inter-personal and inter-spatial in-
equalities, is more complex.
However, economic factors such as stagnant 
living standards and rapid change are only one 
facet of many explanations for the manifest-
ations of global discontent. Just as Anderson 
(1983) regarded the printing press as a catalyst 
for the emergence of nationalism, so we would 
argue that the technological changes that have 
driven the emergence of modern media have 
become a crucial tool to channel discontent. 
Certain populist movements appear to have 
been encouraged often by the widespread 
dissemination of misinformation or, indeed, 
absolute untruths, something that has been em-
powered through the use of social media.
As depicted in the writings of Wired maga-
zine and labelled as ‘techno-positivist’ by 
Bridges (2017, p 5), the Internet has been seen 
as ‘a democratising media which has lowered 
the barriers to entry held by previous gate-
keepers and revolutionised personal freedom’. 
But rather than necessarily being a means to 
more widely distil objective, evidence-based 
information, the Internet has at times acted as 
a platform to amplify existing prejudices and 
peddle highly spurious or false hypotheses (for 
example, the ‘Q-Anon’ conspiracy in the USA). 
And in the current Covid-19 pandemic, it has 
also enabled anti-vaccination campaigners 
to spread their dubious views. This provides 
a marked contrast to the notion that techno-
logical change has been unambiguously liber-
ating and empowering in the creation of the 
networked knowledge economy (Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999). While these groups are on the 
fringe, the liberating power of the Internet has 
given them new reach, and as research into the 
activities of the far Right has shown, highly 
distasteful ideas around race and class can 
be disseminated by such groups to legitimise 
their way into more supposedly mainstream 
conversations (Jakubowicz et  al., 2017; Klein, 
2012). Many of these groups ostensibly see 
themselves as battling an overweening state—
witness the ‘denigration of the mainstream 
media’, often from those who themselves main-
tain significant power and influence via media 
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platforms. Indeed, as George Monbiot, writing 
in the Guardian pointed out:
micro-targeting on social media, peer-to-peer 
texting and now the possibility of deep-fake 
videos allow today’s politicians to confuse 
and misdirect people, to bombard us with lies 
and conspiracy theories, to destroy trust and 
create alternative realities more quickly and 
effectively than any tools 20th-century dicta-
tors had at their disposal.6
This leads to an important point; that while dis-
ruptions can create the potential for discontent, 
they require agency in order to effect an impact 
on the status quo. In this regard, the role of the 
media, and adept communicators who can tap 
into undercurrents of public opinion (and re-
sentments) has been critical.
Giving voice to discontent
A useful way—though we stress it is only 
one way—of conceptualising the differing 
expressions of an individuals’ discontent 
with their local economic, social, political 
or other circumstances and conditions is in 
terms of Hirschman’s (1970) famous ‘Exit-
Voice-Loyalty’ model. In his original model, 
Hirschman posited these three main ways in 
which individuals (for example, as consumers, 
workers, or voters) can express their dissatis-
faction with events or their circumstances, in 
particular with a decline in firms, organisations 
and states. Both Exit and Voice are ‘active’ re-
sponses. Exit refers to any attempt or action 
undertaken by individuals in order to escape a 
dissatisfying situation, such as ceasing to buy a 
given product, quitting their job, or abandoning 
their customary support for a particular pol-
itical party. Contrary to Exit, Voice refers to 
attempts to change a dissatisfying situation, ra-
ther than escaping from it. Voice can be a de-
structive or constructive response. It can vary 
from explicit protest and disruptive action, to 
dialogic encounters aimed at discussing and 
suggesting change and solutions. Loyalty re-
flects passive responses involving continuing 
support and patience in the hope that the situ-
ation or conditions will improve. Fox (2012) 
gives the following example to illustrate Exit, 
Voice and Loyalty:
You’re a Republican intellectual … dismayed 
by the direction your party has taken over 
past few years. Do you a) switch over to the 
Democrats [Exit], b) raise hell in the media 
[Voice], or c) try to stay welcome in the 
party’s corridors of power in order to quietly 
exercise your influence [Loyalty]?7
Since first appearing, Hirschman’s basic model 
has been applied to various social, organisa-
tional and political examples, and has itself 
undergone criticism, reappraisal and indeed 
revisions and elaborations, such as the add-
ition of a fourth response of Neglect, namely 
passive responses that do not allow conditions 
to improve, such as absenteeism, reduced work 
effort, reduced interest, not bothering to vote, 
and the like. It is now commonly referred to as 
the EVLN model or typology. Further, it has 
been argued that these four forms of response 
to adverse or dissatisfying circumstances may 
not themselves be distinct (although to com-
bine all four simultaneously would be difficult), 
and that each may end up having a result op-
posite to that intended (or hoped for).
Although economists have not, in general, 
used Hirschman’s model, they do invoke exit as 
a common (and rational) form of economic be-
haviour, as when a worker quits his/her job out 
of dissatisfaction with or dispute over, say, pay, 
to work for another, better paying, employer. 
They also commonly emphasise how workers 
will leave (exit) one location, where say job 
opportunities or pay are poor and prospects 
are minimal, to move to another location that 
is more economically buoyant, where job op-
portunities are more numerous and wages are 
higher. Exit, that is outward migration, then 
becomes one way in which discontent with the 
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conditions and opportunities in economical 
lagging localities and places finds expression 
among the individuals and social groups af-
fected. We know that economically depressed 
and lagging areas do tend to be areas of net 
outward migration. But whether and how far 
this leads to a subsequent improvement in 
the economic problems in lagging or ‘left be-
hind places’ (for example, by reducing local 
labour supply and hence forcing local em-
ployers to pay better wages) is questionable. 
Such geographical exit behaviour tends to be 
selective, in that it is the more educated, more 
enterprising and younger members of the local 
workforce who are more likely to abandon a 
lagging area for another more economically 
dynamic area elsewhere. This ‘spatial selection’, 
as urban economists like to call it, may there-
fore simply leave the least educated or skilled 
workers trapped in their depressed locality. 
Also, social and community ties, and housing 
market conditions, may also limit Exit behav-
iour (out-migration). Exit may not, therefore, 
serve to reduce regional inequalities in the 
‘self-correcting’ way beloved by neoclassical 
economists.
In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising 
where such inequalities persist over an extended 
period of time that Hirschman-style Voice be-
comes the form of active response in the lagging 
areas. Discontent among the local populations 
of such areas, who are unable or unwilling to 
move out, may reach a point where different 
forms of open protest and disaffection surface. 
The series of hunger marches from the eco-
nomically depressed, high unemployment coal-
field and heavy industry areas of northern and 
midlands Britain down to London in the 1920s 
and 1930s are a classic example of geographical 
Voice behaviour. The UK coalminers’ strike by 
the country’s pit communities in 1984–1985 is 
another. The Brexit vote of 2016, in which some 
of the highest proportions of local populations 
voting to leave the European union were in ‘left 
behind’ constituencies, is yet another. In this ex-
ample, Voice acted to secure Exit (cessation of 
membership of the EU). A more recent example 
illustrates how Exit behaviour may function as a 
form of Voice. In the UK 2019 General Election 
the electorates in many northern constituen-
cies—so-called ‘Red Wall’ constituencies, areas 
that had traditionally been staunch Labour 
heartland areas—abandoned Labour in large 
numbers and voted instead for the Conservative 
Party. Seemingly disillusioned with the failure 
of Labour to tackle the longstanding economic 
disadvantages of their areas, they switched their 
allegiance to Boris Johnson with his promise 
‘to get Brexit done’ and ‘level up’ the country. 
Similarly, Trump’s presidential success in 2016 
also reflected, in part, the disillusionment 
of the residents of rundown and left behind 
towns and cities in the USA’s Rust Belt states, 
areas that more typically had been Democrat 
but which abandoned the latter in favour of 
the Republicans, again influenced by Trump’s 
promise to ‘bring jobs back to the USA’.
Clearly, these and other examples of dis-
content in economically depressed localities 
cannot be wholly or solely explained in terms 
of Hirschman’s schema. But the latter never-
theless offers an interesting framework for fur-
ther work and analysis. When Hirschman first 
proposed his framework, there were no social 
media platforms of the sort that exist today. 
These platforms can be used to spread discon-
tent, and to mobilise collective Exit and Voice 
behaviours. This was a crucial dimension of the 
Brexit, Johnson and Trump votes. A  relevant 
question is whether, to what extent, and under 
what circumstances, social media increase the 
attractiveness and effectiveness of Voice rela-
tive to Exit,.
The geographical manifestations 
of discontent: contributions in this 
special issue
Against this background, this Special Issue exam-
ines a number of the key issues that have been 
argued to shape the geography of discontent and, 
importantly, how societies might respond to the 
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challenges presented. The emphasis has been on 
examining evidence from a number of countries 
using different measures of discontent. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, how people ex-
press their discontent can vary considerably from 
formal voting channels to more informal chan-
nels like social media to direct social action, such 
as public marches and protests.
A key theme in much of the research is to as-
sess the relative importance of spatial economic 
inequality as a driver of social discontent and 
its subsequent political expression. Moreover, 
it is of great interest to establish whether views 
are influenced more by perceptions rather than 
more evidenced based indicators. Diaz-Lanchas 
et al. (2021) recognise that the causes of recent 
expressions of social discontent across the re-
gions of the EU are complex and to understand 
them properly it is necessary to bring together 
the contribution of both contextual factors and 
personal attitudes. Their hypothesis is that dis-
content is the result of how individuals per-
ceive both their present and future well-being 
which is, to some degree, informed by the eco-
nomic conditions they are experiencing. Their 
measure of discontent is dissatisfaction with 
the EU, based on a composite indicator of re-
sponses from the Eurobarometer Surveys in 
2018 and 2019. This is combined with regional 
contextual data to control for the conditions 
faced by individuals in particular locations.
Their findings confirm the importance of 
economic factors on individual discontent, par-
ticularly among those who consider they have 
been ‘losers’ from globalisation, who tend to be 
relatively less well placed in the labour market 
and live in the lagging regions. While they rec-
ognise that these findings are relatively well 
known, their analysis suggests that these effects 
are compounded by how individuals shape fu-
ture expectations. They also find that attitudes 
to the EU are primarily affected by how in-
dividuals perceive their national democratic 
system. The authors consider that there are im-
portant implications for how EU and national 
policies should respond to the negative spatial 
impacts that arise from the Covid-19 pandemic 
and other such future challenges.
In a similar vein, Segovia et  al. (2021) 
examine the links between social discontent 
and inequality in Latin America. They consider 
three types of factors that might be associated 
with dissatisfaction with democracy. These 
are personal characteristics, inequality related 
variables and measures of institutional quality. 
They use data from the latest Lationbarometro 
(2018) Opinion Survey that provides evidence 
on 18 Latin American countries and Spain. 
They argue that their results confirm previous 
research on explanations of social discontent 
in Latin America. It does seem as though in-
equality of opportunity and poor institutional 
quality are associated with discontent and that 
traditional measures based on the Gini Index 
may be less appropriate. They find that per-
sonal characteristics other than socioeconomic 
status are less significant.
In the Spanish context, Arana (2021) assesses 
the economic and social factors behind the rise 
in support for the Spanish right wing party Vox 
and for Catalonian independence. She exam-
ines the impact of the substantial rise in un-
employment in Spain following the financial 
crisis and subsequent austerity measures which 
reinforced the substantial degree of regional 
inequality across Spain. Her conclusion is that 
the impact of regional economic inequality has 
to be considered alongside the political issues 
facing Spain since the return to democracy in 
1977 and the formation of the first coalition 
government.
Rodriguez-Pose et al. (2021) argue that the 
rise in social discontent that arguably under-
pinned the election of Donald Trump in 2016 
was not the result of widening interpersonal 
income (and wealth) inequality in American 
society, nor a reflection of the ability of social 
capital or traditional forms of civic engagement 
to help in containing resentment. Rather, the 
explanation lies in the impact across regions in 
America of longer term economic and popula-
tion decline. In fact, interestingly, those areas 
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that supported Trump the most were likely to 
be characterised by relatively high levels of so-
cial community and did not thus fall easily into 
areas ‘bowling alone’ as described in Robert 
Putman’s seminal work. They chose to ‘golf’ 
with Trump to express their dissatisfaction 
and, if anything, high levels of social capital re-
inforced their collective ability to speak-out.
Denti and Faggian (2021) provide another 
interesting analysis of how discontent with 
economic circumstances can manifest itself in 
ways other than the ballot box. Their research, 
based on data for Italy, examines whether spa-
tial income inequality is associated with spatial 
variations in the incidence of cyberhate crime. 
Their findings support the view that income in-
equality does indeed foster a higher incidence 
of cyberhate even after allowing for other 
factors like unemployment and immigration. 
Worryingly, they find that the impact is not at-
tenuated by areas having higher levels of edu-
cated people—and in fact, the opposite.
Whatever the precise importance of indi-
vidual factors in the generation of social dis-
content, there is evidence that people also react 
to how well they perceive their needs are being 
addressed by local and central government and 
thus issues of governance and policy. Drawing 
on evidence on the spatial nature of the UK 
Brexit vote De Ruyter et  al. (2021) show 
that regional governance arrangements play 
a key role. Combining data on Brexit voting 
patterns in the West Midlands and Scotland 
with evidence from targeted interviews and 
focus groups, they have gained insight into 
why people voted the way they did. After al-
lowing for demographic factors, their analysis 
shows that perceptions of how well regional 
governance arrangements were responding to 
their needs was of importance. In this respect, 
the fragmented sub-national governance pos-
ition in England in recent years relative to 
Scotland was an important influence on dif-
ferences in voters’ perceptions between these 
regions. There is a clear message here, and it is 
that local governance arrangements and how 
voters perceive that local (and central) gov-
ernment are responding to the economic chal-
lenges they face, matter. The implications for 
the current British ‘Levelling-up’ agenda are 
obvious.
This view is reinforced in the research pro-
vided by Weller (2021) who analyses voting pat-
terns in two disadvantaged and deindustrialising 
areas in the State of Victoria, Australia. She 
considers the extent to which a federal political 
system, a preferential voting system and timely 
policy intervention can help to mitigate social 
discontent and its expression infringe or protest 
voting. Her analysis is persuasive and she con-
cludes that debate in Europe on voter rebellion 
takes insufficient account of the overall demo-
cratic representation process, and how gov-
ernments respond to places facing economic 
turmoil. She suggests that ‘explanations for the 
rise of populism in Europe could spend more 
time asking why political frameworks have not 
responded in a more timely way to localised 
crisis, and why they have not sufficiently ac-
knowledged that places and the people in them 
do matter’.
The research presented by McCann and 
Ortega-Argiles (2021) picks up on the inad-
equacy of the traditional policy response to the 
geographical imbalances created by deindus-
trialisation, the financial crisis and other fac-
tors that have created such spatial asymmetry 
of British prosperity. Core to their argument 
is that the assessment by Government, and in-
deed wider British society, as to the nature of 
the problem of regional imbalance problem, 
and how best to respond to it, is heavily influ-
enced by popular narratives that often gain ac-
ceptance and currency but with relative weak 
evidential credentials. They use the example of 
the Brexit vote to good effect in this respect 
and also recent discussion on ‘Levelling-Up’. 
These narratives are not always ‘heavily an-
chored in economic realities’ and their distil-
lation into policy responses hinder attempts to 
‘genuinely rebalance or level up the economic 
geography of place’.
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There is much interest in understanding 
whether there are systematic differences be-
tween urban and rural areas in political dis-
content and the key influences involved. 
Recognising that the existing research base is 
relatively thin, Kenny and Luca (2021) ana-
lyze pooled, cross-sectional individual-level 
data from the European Social Survey over the 
period 2002–2018 for the EU27 Member States, 
the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland. 
They find that there does appear to be powerful 
and significant differences in social and polit-
ical attitudes, but they do not reflect a simple 
binary urban and rural division but rather a 
gradient from inner cities to suburban towns 
and rural areas. Differences are due to compos-
itional and contextual factors. Understanding 
these is clearly important in developing policy 
responses.
Yet another take on the urban–rural dimen-
sion is provided by Larsson et  al. (2021) who 
support the Kenny and Luca finding that it is 
not appropriate to adopt a rigid urban–rural, 
core-periphery or even North-South dichotomy 
in understanding the geography of discontent. 
They argue for a more nuanced approach that 
reflects how a place relates to its surrounding 
communities and regions. Thus, ‘relational 
proximity’ is important in understanding the 
geography of discontent. They analyze the mu-
nicipal distribution of electorate support for 
Swedish Democrats in the 2014 and 2018 na-
tional general elections. Interestingly, their 
accessibility measures are based on wages dis-
counted by time-travel distances. Their findings 
suggest that greater accessibility to other large 
municipalities within the same region appears 
to have influenced support for the Swedish 
Democrats. Whether an area is surrounded by 
relatively larger neighbouring municipalities 
has also been important. Clearly, why and how 
proximity effects influence relative discontent, 
and its political expression, should be the sub-
ject of future research.
A further important issue in this respect re-
lates to whether individuals consider that their 
capital city has a positive or negative influence 
on the development of their own region and 
how this affects their levels of trust, their sense 
of being Left Behind and their degree of rela-
tive inclusivity in the national economic devel-
opment. Rickardsson et  al. (2001) use recent 
panel survey data for Sweden to investigate 
how individuals in different regions perceive 
the impact of their capital city of Stockholm 
on development of their own region and also 
Sweden taken as a whole. They find that indi-
viduals who perceive that the development of 
their own region has been ‘less advantageous’ 
tend to consider the capital has had a negative 
effect on the area they live in and the country 
taken as a whole. This view tends to increase 
with degree of peripherality.
Concluding reflections
This Special Edition concludes with brief 
commentaries from three scholars who have 
much long-standing experience in studying 
regional and urban economic development. 
Florida (2021) believes that rising discontent 
has to be seen as a ‘quintessentially geographic 
phenomenon—a fundamental product of dis-
tinctive economic and cultural geographies 
and of deepening differences in the day-to-day 
lives of different class and racial groups’. He 
considers the rise of discontent on the pol-
itical right in the USA and elsewhere to em-
phasise the importance of conservative values 
among voters and their dissatisfaction with the 
politics and political culture of post-industrial 
society. So much so that in some cases people 
do not necessarily vote to reflect what is best 
for their own economic interest. In this respect 
he reinforces the findings of Rodrequez-Pose, 
Lee and Lipp (2021) that many voters voting 
for Donald Trump were not necessarily rebel-
ling against relative decline in their incomes or 
feeling isolated due to a decline in the social 
capital in their local communities. In fact, to the 
contrary, Florida builds on the importance of 
cultural factors in the expression of discontent 
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emphasising the role of psychological and emo-
tional factors. However, he also argues that 
it is necessary to recognise the role of spatial 
sorting whereby people with particular values 
group with others of the same disposition in 
particular places. And, in this respect, a key ex-
ample has been the move of those with ‘more 
open-minded, liberal or cosmopolitan values 
moving to bigger cities and tech-hubs, while 
those with less education and less skill and who 
hold traditional family values are concentrated 
in left behind places and in suburbs and rural 
areas’.
He suggests that such spatial sorting associ-
ated with structural shifts in societies from in-
dustrial to tertiary knowledge based structures 
shows how the geography of discontent evolves 
and changes through time with changes in the 
nature of capitalism and the impact of tech-
nology on the nature of work. He emphasises 
the tendency for the rise of a ‘spiky, increas-
ingly winner take all geography’ with a rela-
tively small number of places and the people in 
them doing very well fueling discontent among 
those in less well-off places and circumstances. 
He sees this as the key ‘fault-line’ in the polit-
ical divide. However, as he points out, even the 
largest superstar cities have powerful divisions 
within them that can fuel discontent. Florida 
emphasises that it is unwise to see social dis-
content and its geographical dimensions as in 
anyway a static phenomenon, but rather a fun-
damental feature of the way in which capitalist 
societies churn.
Oliveira Martins (2021) argues that al-
though economic change in society usefully 
results in increased income and employment 
in aggregate there are often substantial geo-
graphical differences in the winners and losers 
from the process. As he argues, this emphasises 
the need for policy intervention to compen-
sate the losers. Otherwise, as the research in 
this Special Edition shows, there is often in-
creased social discontent. However, as is now 
widely realised, ‘place-based’ policy interven-
tions aimed at improving economic and social 
conditions in ‘left behind’ places have to be 
sensitive to what works and why. As he ar-
gues, by tailoring policies to places, national 
policy makers can optimise their possibility 
of generating productivity enhancing employ-
ment growth. However, this often requires at-
tention to ensuring the appropriate policies 
are adopted and that adequate sub-national 
governance structures are in place. He points 
to the attention that the OECD has given to 
encouraging ‘Effective Public Investment 
across Levels of Government8”. Such effective 
subnational intervention has become of even 
greater importance in the light of the dif-
ferentiated spatial impacts of the Covid-19 
crisis. He suggests that the advances made in 
digital technology, together with new oppor-
tunities for where people will actually work, 
has changed the ‘spatial equilibrium’ of em-
ployment opportunities in ways that may well 
mitigate some of the social discontent that has 
emerged from previous waves of economic 
change. In a similar fashion there are oppor-
tunities for new spatial divisions of labour as 
governments react to climate change.
Muro (2021) focuses on how the 2016 and 
2020 American elections have emphasised 
the pronounced economic disparities that 
have emerged in America between what he 
sees to be the diverse and mainly thriving 
metropolitan regions and the small towns, 
ex-urban and mainly rural areas. Regional 
divergence in economic opportunities has 
generated social discontent that has found 
expression in the ballot box. He believes that 
many Americans are now of the view that nei-
ther market forces or the rise of technology 
clusters are going to do much for them. In 
fact, many Americans look with increasing 
nervousness at a geographical divide that 
contains ‘a short list of ‘superstar city’ regions 
and a long list of places going sidewise or 
being ‘left behind’.
A particularly telling statistic is that the 
five ‘superstar’ metro areas of Boston, the San 
Francisco Bay Area (San Francisco and San 
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Jose), Seattle, and San Diego created 90% of 
all innovation sector job growth between 2005 
and 2017. By way of contrast, some 224 out of 
382 US metro areas saw their share of the na-
tional innovation decline over the period. In 
short, the American geography of innovation 
has been one of ‘winner-takes-most’. The dra-
matic concentration of economic power in 
relatively few regions is now challenging the 
belief held by successive American admin-
istrations that market forces will eventually 
bring about regional convergence. The new 
Biden administration is unleashing a wave of 
place sensitive programmes centred on pro-
curement, R&D policy, infrastructure, training 
and education.
However, concerns still remain about both 
the relative commitment and eventual effect-
iveness of the mainstream response. Some re-
assurance on commitment is provided by the 
sheer scale of the Biden Build Back Better 
reconstruction agenda, which could amount 
to some $7trillion. As part of this, there are 
plans to create 18 regional ‘technology hubs’, 
and encouragingly these proposals appear to 
carry bipartisan legislative support. It is recog-
nised that generous funding will be required. 
However, Munro suggests that technology 
hubs aside, there is a need for a more rad-
ical approach to how the economic problems 
of relatively ‘left behind’ regions in America 
are addressed. Funding is needed to tackle 
the ‘place conscious’ needs of lagging regions 
across a range of issues, including infrastruc-
ture, labour market development and much 
more besides. And there are worrying ques-
tions that remain as to what should be the ap-
propriate geographical scale of assistance, and 
thus whether Federal support will end up being 
spread too thinly and thus incapable of having 
enough economic impact to quell the social 
discontent in ‘left behind’ places. However, as 
Munro concludes, it is encouraging that the 
problems of economically lagging places are 
now firmly on the agenda of the current USA 
administration.
Endnotes
1 It has been estimated that disease unknowingly 
introduced by Europeans accounted for 95% of 
Native American casualties in North and South 
America during the post-Columbian period. 
Smallpox was responsible for the deaths of some 
50% of the Incas during the first epidemics. See 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/
news-guns-germs-steel-jared-diamond-interview.
2 Of course, a rather orientalist (Said, 1978) lexicon, 
Nasser’s mass appeal was given the—typically de-
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